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Abstract Recent years have seen a surge in online collaboration between experts
and amateurs on scientific research. In this article, we analyse the epistemologi-
cal implications of these crowdsourced projects, with a focus on Zooniverse, the
world’s largest citizen science web portal. We use quantitative methods to evaluate
the platform’s success in producing large volumes of observation statements and high
impact scientific discoveries relative to more conventional means of data process-
ing. Through empirical evidence, Bayesian reasoning, and conceptual analysis, we
show how information and communication technologies enhance the reliability, scal-
ability, and connectivity of crowdsourced e-research, giving online citizen science
projects powerful epistemic advantages over more traditional modes of scientific
investigation. These results highlight the essential role played by technologically
mediated social interaction in contemporary knowledge production. We conclude by
calling for an explicitly sociotechnical turn in the philosophy of science that com-
bines insights from statistics and logic to analyse the latest developments in scientific
research.
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1 Introduction
Experts and amateurs have been collaborating on so-called ‘citizen science’ projects
for more than a century (Silvertown 2009). Traditionally, such projects relied upon vol-
unteers to participate in data collection. In more recent years, the spread of information
and communication technologies (ICTs) has allowed users to become increasingly
involved in data analysis. Early online citizen science initiatives made use of par-
ticipants’ spare processing power to create distributed computing networks to run
simulations or perform other complex functions (Anderson et al. 2002). The latest
wave of citizen science projects has replaced this passive software approach with inter-
active web platforms designed to maximise user engagement. Utilising fairly simple
tools provided by well-designed websites, amateurs have helped model complex pro-
tein structures (Khatib et al. 2011a, b), map the neural circuitry of the mammalian
retina (Kim et al. 2014), and discover new astronomical objects (Lintott et al. 2009;
Cardamone et al. 2009). As of December 2015, citizen science project aggregator
SciStarter links to over a thousand active projects (SciStarter 2015).
What are the philosophical implications of this new brand of crowdsourced e-
research? Sociologists have studied the demographics and motivations of virtual
citizen scientists for years (e.g., Nov et al. 2011; Rotman et al. 2012; Raddick et al.
2013), while data scientists have extensively examined the mechanics of user contri-
butions to such sites (e.g., Kawrykow et al. 2012; Ponciano et al. 2014; Franzoni and
Sauermann 2014). Philosophers, however, have so far been silent on these methodolog-
ical developments. In this article, we argue that a close examination of crowdsourced
e-research reveals important lessons for epistemology and philosophy of science.
Virtual citizen science labs constitute large sociotechnical systems in which profes-
sionals, volunteers, and digital technologies come together to pursue three important
epistemic goals:
(1) Reliability The designers of citizen science websites employ numerous quality
control measures to ensure that user contributions are accurate and precise.
(2) Scalability Hundreds of thousands of volunteers from around the world regularly
participate in citizen science projects, analysing unprecedented volumes of data
for a wide variety of scientific studies.
(3) Connectivity Information and communication networks unlock the distributed
knowledge of large epistemic communities by establishing numerous channels
that allow users to confer with one another and direct information toward one or
several central nodes.
In what follows, we present empirical evidence that crowdsourced e-research is
uniquely reliable, scalable, and connective. We argue that these properties are essential
for the promotion of scientific knowledge, and therefore that any system that max-
imises all three not only constitutes a major methodological advancement, but merits
close philosophical attention. We conclude that the success of virtual citizen science
underscores the irreducibly sociotechnical nature of all scientific inquiry.
Following an overview of this paper’s methods in Sect. 2, we proceed to examine the
structural mechanics of contemporary citizen science in Sects. 3–5, with an emphasis
on the epistemic advantages afforded by web-enabled mass collaboration. Our findings
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indicate that such projects tend to generate more observations and higher quality
discoveries than similar studies using traditional methods. The significance of these
results goes far beyond the limits of citizen science. We close in Sect. 6 with a review
of our findings and a proposal for further research in sociotechnical epistemology.
2 Motivation and methods
Suppose Albert and Niels are rational agents with opposing views on which of two
mutually incompatible scientific hypotheses is correct. Let us assume that fundamental
disagreements between the two men are negligible—they play by roughly the same
epistemic rules and are each willing to concede a point in the face of sufficient evidence
or compelling arguments. Yet despite their concordance on basic principles, they just
cannot seem to agree on this particular case. What might explain this (common)
scenario?
Say Niels happens to be right in this instance. Then at least one of three possi-
bilities accounts for his success: (a) he got lucky; (b) he had better evidence; or (c)
he had a better understanding of the evidence. If our goal is to find the most fruitful
strategies for scientific inquiry, then explanation (a) is irrelevant. Options (b) and (c)
are more interesting, however. The first highlights the importance of good evidence,
which can be split into data quality and quantity (Floridi and Illari 2014). The second
suggests that even in the face of identical evidence, superior results are achieved by the
agent who does a better job of finding the underlying structure behind a given set of
observations.
In one of the seminal works of social epistemology, Goldman (2003) sets out to
evaluate various systems for making and improving judgments through different forms
of testimony. Central to his project is the notion of ‘veritistic value’, a measure of one’s
degree of knowledge or truth possession with respect to a proposition. Let T stand for
the truth-value function such that T (p) = 1 iff p is true and T (p) = 0 iff p is false.
Let C stand for agent A’s credence function such that CA(p) = 1 iff A is certain that p
and CA(p) = 0 iff A is certain that ∼p. Then the veritistic value of A’s judgment with
respect to p may be defined as a function V such that VA(p) = 1 −|T (p)− CA(p)|.1
In our motivating example above, Niels’ judgment was of higher veritistic value than
Albert’s.
We submit that for a wide array of projects throughout the natural sciences, crowd-
sourcing offers the best available method for maximising the expected veritistic value
of researchers’ hypotheses. Thoughtful web protocols and global Internet access ensure
high data quality and quantity, while the sociotechnical network’s topology pushes
anomalous observations to the fore, thereby challenging experts to find the latent
structure underlying the natural phenomena they study. This conclusion is derived
from a combination of empirical findings and logical reasoning presented below. For
the former, we draw primarily on data from and about Zooniverse, the world’s largest
citizen science web portal. For the latter, we adopt a Bayesian confirmation theoretic
1 Goldman does not use these precise formulae, although they are implicit in his ‘trichotomous scheme’.
See Goldman (2003, Sect. 3.4, pp. 87–94).
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framework that borrows from the social epistemology of Goldman (2003) and the
epistemic logic of Fagin et al. (1995).
Because a priori reflection alone is insufficient to substantiate our argument, we
review Zooniverse’s 2014 transaction logs and complete publication history to better
understand the platform’s internal mechanics and scientific output. With dozens of
active projects and over 1.4 million subscribers worldwide, Zooniverse exemplifies
the reliability, scalability, and connectivity of contemporary crowdsourced e-research
we intend to analyse. The site began in July 2007 with a single project, Galaxy Zoo,
which invited users (aka ‘Zooites’) to help classify the morphological properties of
galaxies captured by the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS). Following the success
of this inaugural venture, administrators (aka ‘Zookeepers’) expanded the site into
a multi-project platform in December 2009. While the vast majority of Zooniverse
projects are devoted to topics in the natural sciences, the site has recently branched
out to include digital humanities initiatives as well. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of
all 27 projects hosted by the platform in 2014.
Unlike the competitive games offered by designers of other popular crowdsourced
science sites such as FoldIt (Cooper et al. 2010) and EyeWire (Kim et al. 2014),
Zooniverse projects are based entirely upon classifications, be they of galaxies, whale
calls, or ancient manuscripts. Each project starts with a simple set of instructions
on how to classify the relevant digital artefacts, followed by a steady stream of raw
data ready for processing (Simpson et al. 2014). As of December 2015, Zooniverse
classifications have been the basis for 81 articles published in peer-reviewed journals,
in addition to a handful of conference papers and book chapters (Zooniverse 2015).
We examined those publications for content and scientometric performance using
Elsevier’s Scopus database and the Thomson Reuters Institute for Scientific Informa-
tion Journal Citation Reports. Web analytic data from Zooniverse’s 2014 transaction
logs were generously provided by the platform’s administrators. Together, these
sources provide the empirical basis for this paper’s epistemological claims. Quan-
titative analysis was conducted in the R statistical environment (version 3.2.2), with
significance levels for all tests uniformly fixed at α = 0.05.
3 Reliability: the wisdom of the crowd
The success of any scientific study, crowdsourced or otherwise, crucially relies upon
the reliability of its observations. How can we trust Zooniverse’s classification data if
they merely represent the uninformed opinion of a large community of amateurs?
3.1 Quality control protocols
The insight that groups are often better at producing knowledge than individuals is an
old one. A formal proof of the claim was originally derived by Condorcet (1785), whose
famous jury theorem states that given a defendant of uncertain guilt and a collection of
jurors whose judgments are each better than random but less than perfect, the majority
of jurors is always more likely to be correct than any individual juror. Moreover, the
probability of a correct majority judgment approaches 1 as the jury size increases. An
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Fig. 1 Dendrogram depicting the typological breakdown of all 27 Zooniverse projects active in 2014
important corollary to Condorcet’s jury theorem, however, is that opposite results will
hold for worse than random jurors. That is, given a jury composed of individuals with
a less than 0.5 chance of making accurate judgments, the majority is always more
likely to be wrong than any individual juror, and the probability of a correct majority
judgment approaches 0 as the jury size increases.
The initial sceptical challenge to citizen science is motivated by something like
the corollary to Condorcet’s jury theorem (Collins 2014). Highly specialised subjects
within the natural sciences are dominated by experts for good reason. Amateur views
on particle physics or microbiology are probably wrong, these sceptics allege, and
large groups of amateurs pooling their collective ignorance will surely do no better.
The issue is perhaps best understood as a special case of the more general problem of
testimony, upon which much of social epistemology turns.
With hundreds of thousands of users participating in any given crowdsourcing
project, odds are that at least some will perform worse than random at certain data
classification tasks. To stay on the right side of Condorcet’s jury theorem, Zooniverse’s
administrators employ several strategies:
• Design simplicity Before a project is launched, Zookeepers ensure that tasks are
simple and clearly explained to maximise potential contributors and minimise user
error.
• Automated filtering Once a project is underway, algorithms filter classifications by
user performance and community agreement across observations.
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Fig. 2 A screenshot from the original Galaxy Zoo website
• Comprehensive review Once a project is completed, classifications are weighted
according to each user’s tendency to be in the majority and full datasets are subject
to expert review.
Together, these quality control measures have a profound impact on the scientific
utility of amateur observations. To see how, consider the case of Galaxy Zoo.
Zooniverse’s first project was a straightforward classification task, explained to new
users in a brief tutorial that made no use of technical terminology. Volunteers were
presented with paradigmatic examples of standard galaxy types and asked to determine
to which type subsequent galaxies properly belonged. A total of six classifications were
possible, with small schematic symbols of the available options permanently visible
at the right of the screen (see Fig. 2). No experience in astrophysics was presumed,
and in fact, with just a little practice, even young children could (and did) participate
(Raddick et al. 2013).
Once users completed the tutorial, they were unknowingly subject to a probationary
period during which they were presented with test data that Zookeepers considered
unambiguous cases of their particular galactic morphologies. Classifications by those
who failed to correctly identify 11 out of their first 15 images were not saved in the
site’s database (Lintott et al. 2008). This ensured that erroneous results from volunteers
who misunderstood the instructions, experienced technical difficulties, or perhaps even
maliciously sought to corrupt Galaxy Zoo’s data, would not confound the project’s
findings.
As a further precaution, Zooniverse administrators designed a redundant website
architecture in which numerous users reviewed each galaxy before it entered the
project’s catalogue. Objects were processed an average of 38 times each, allowing
researchers to estimate the confidence of their conclusions by evaluating the extent of
community consensus around particular classifications (Lintott et al. 2008).
Once the entire SDSS survey had been classified, Zookeepers applied a weighted
voting schema in which each user’s contributions were valued in proportion to the
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average popularity of her classifications.2 A comparison of weighted and unweighted
results revealed that, while there was practically no difference between the two scoring
methods in terms of ultimate morphological selections, weighting user votes pushed
tens of thousands of galaxies past researchers’ 80 and 95 % consensus thresholds for
entrance into ‘clean’ and ‘superclean’ morphological samples, respectively (Lintott
et al. 2008).
A final, crucial step in Zooniverse’s quality control protocol is the expert review of
user observations. Examining Galaxy Zoo’s results, researchers found significant over-
classification of anti-clockwise spirality, probably due to the population’s preference
for right handedness (Land et al. 2008). Elliptical galaxies were also over-classified,
most likely because spiral galaxies viewed at great distances undergo redshifts that
render their arms blurry and hard to detect (Bamford et al. 2009). Land et al. and
Bamford et al. were both able to identify these errors and correct for user biases by
means of fairly simple algorithms.
With these measures in place, Galaxy Zoo’s output exceeded all expectations. Com-
paring the project’s classifications with those from three visual inspection studies
conducted by professional astronomers on samples from the same SDSS images,
Lintott et al. (2008) found that Zooites agreed with the experts in more than 90 %
of cases—a rate comparable to experts’ mutual agreement with one another. Simi-
larly positive results have been reported for numerous crowdsourced projects across
the natural sciences, including NASA’s Clickworkers initiative (Kanefsky et al. 2001),
Stardust@home (Méndez 2008), Foldit (Khatib et al. 2011b), and EyeWire (Kim et al.
2014).
It should perhaps come as no surprise to learn that large epistemic communities
are capable of generating reliable observations for scientific research. After all, pro-
fessors have long relied on untrained undergraduates for basic data collection tasks.
The differences between that familiar case and this novel one are twofold. In the
university setting, there are academic and social incentives to be a proficient data
collector. In crowdsourced e-research, the data analysis platform itself ensures user
performance. Second, we know by Condorcet’s theorem that a jury’s verdict asymp-
totically approaches truth as the number of better than random jurors increases. The
quantity of participants involved in a given study therefore has a qualitative impact
on the judgments they issue. The combination of shrewd web design and sheer user
volume can turn the public into a valuable resource for scientific research.
3.2 Veritistic value and Bayesian reasoning
Goldman’s social epistemology relies heavily on Bayesian inference, a methodology
he argues is supported by the veritistic approach. He reports a result he credits to
Shaked (see Goldman and Shaked 1991), who combines Bayes’ theorem with Jensen’s
2 The system worked as follows. For each galaxy x to which volunteer k assigned morphology F , the
partial weight of k’s vote was defined as the number of other Zooites who agreed that Fx, divided by the
total number of galaxies classified by k, Nx (k). The summation of such ratios for all Nx (k) represents k’s
total weight wk . Total weights for all users were then scaled to a mean of 1, and applied to each vote in the
database. See Lintott et al. (2008).
123
748 Synthese (2018) 195:741–764
inequality to prove (roughly) that if agent A has an accurate model of hypothesis h,
then updating her beliefs with some relevant evidence e will tend to bring A closer to
h’s truth-value. Specifically, he shows that, if the following three criteria are met:
(1) Relevance:
P(h) = P(h|e)
(2) Bounds:
0 < CA(h) < 1 and
P(e|h)
P(e| ∼ h) = 1
(3) Model accuracy:
CA(h) = P(h) and CA(e|h)CA(e| ∼ h) =
P(e|h)
P(e| ∼ h)
then A’s expected change in veritistic value after conditionalising upon e is strictly
positive.3 That is,
E[VA(h)|e − VA(h)] > 0.
Shaked’s theorem is rather trivial in most applications. Rarely do we have precise
values of prior probabilities or relevant Bayes factors, and if we did, it would hardly
be surprising to learn that combining the two would likely produce a net knowledge
increase. Nevertheless, the result is important in the present context because, as we
shall argue, it provides a firm logical foundation for crowdsourcing in the natural
sciences.
Say h stands for some particular observational claim, e.g. ‘Galaxy x is elliptical’,
and e stands for a set of weighted user votes with respect to galaxy x’s morphology.
When astrophysicist A examines the data, she is in a good position to evaluate both
the prior probability that x is elliptical, given her background knowledge about the
frequency of elliptical galaxies, and the likelihood ratio that x is elliptical, given the
degree of community consensus evident in e and/or relevant user biases. Even if the
quality of user contributions to some particularly confounding project were relatively
low, as long as experts could determine their accuracy, then Shaked’s theorem proves
that Bayesian reasoning from such data will tend to increase the veritistic value of
collective classifications. When amateur testimony is both accurately evaluated and
generally reliable, as the protocols outlined above are designed to ensure, then the
resultant data should be of extremely high quality.
3 Our notation differs from that presented by Goldman and Shaked, but the substance of their theorem
remains unchanged. See Goldman and Shaked (1991). Their complete proof only appears in the appendix
of a later book, which includes a reprinted edition of Goldman and Shaked’s original article. See Goldman
(1992, chapter 12).
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Fig. 3 Log–log scatterplot of Zooniverse users versus classifications, with an ordinary least squares regres-
sion line fit to the data
4 Scalability: the more the Merrier
High-throughput techniques across the natural sciences have given modern researchers
more accurate, precise, and numerous measurements than ever before, yet pattern
recognition software for visual, audio, and video data is still fairly crude. How can
scientists take advantage of these emerging technologies most efficiently?
4.1 Users and observations in Zooniverse
In the months preceding the launch of Galaxy Zoo, Zooniverse cofounder Kevin
Schawinski spent a week classifying 50,000 galaxies as part of his D.Phil. research
in the Astrophysics Department at the University of Oxford (Schawinski et al. 2007).
The task was gruelling. Presuming 12-hour workdays, Schawinski must have aver-
aged a classification every six seconds for seven straight days. By comparison, the
day Galaxy Zoo went online, users were averaging 70,000 classifications per hour
(Nielsen 2011). By the time Zooites finished processing the complete SDSS survey of
almost 900,000 objects, their work constituted the largest morphological catalogue in
the history of astronomy (Bamford et al. 2009).
Zooniverse’s 2014 transaction logs reveal a strong positive correlation between
a project’s user totals and the number of classifications it generates. Figure 3 is a
log–log scatterplot depicting the relationship between these two variables over the
223 complete project-months for which such data were recorded. A simple linear
regression model was fit to the log transform data, indicating that user totals account for
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approximately 80 % of the variance in a project’s classificatory output. While variables
like user engagement and media coverage would no doubt help to construct a more
complete picture of how and why some citizen science initiatives are more fruitful than
others (Cox et al. 2015), this plot clearly shows that the number of volunteers who
contribute to a project is a strong predictor of how many observations it will produce.
The success of any given citizen science project has always been dependent on its
ability to attract sufficient volunteers. However, only in the era of global ICT networks
can these initiatives reach the critical mass at which they begin to match or even surpass
the efforts of professionals relying on more traditional modes of data processing.
Consider, for example, the case of astronomical catalogues. An astronomical catalogue
is a complete list of objects of some common type (e.g., galaxies) detected by one
or several instruments working in concert, usually as part of an astronomical survey
(e.g., the SDSS). While scientific articles often draw on select or simulated data to
explore some particular phenomenon, astronomical catalogues represent researchers’
total observational output of a particular kind. Comparing the number of observations
in traditional and crowdsourced editions of such works therefore offers the best means
of testing the relative fruitfulness of the two methodologies.
In the four years since the aforementioned Galaxy Zoo catalogue was published,
Zooniverse has gathered user classifications into seven more astronomical catalogues,
two of which were the first of their kind.4 The other five are the largest of their sort
ever compiled, exceeding previous record holders by more than order of magnitude
on average. By comparison, traditional catalogues tend to build on previous work in
increments of about 80 %. Table 1 includes observation totals for each of these five
Zooniverse catalogues5 and the traditional catalogues they superseded,6 along with the
percent increases in observation counts represented by each. Where possible, statistics
on three previous catalogues are included for comparison.
A Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) test found significant difference between the per-
cent increases in observation totals represented by Zooniverse projects and those of
traditional catalogues relative to previous collections, D = 0.86, p = 0.02. While the
4 Following the discovery of a rare object in the initial Galaxy Zoo project (about which more below),
Zooniverse launched an intergalactic search for similar anomalies, ultimately resulting in the identification
of 19 candidate ‘voorwerps’ (Keel et al. 2012). Though there are several other coronal mass ejection (CME)
catalogues, Zooniverse’s is unique in that it deliberately prioritises quality over quantity, ignoring minor
CMEs while gathering the most extensive time series data ever recorded on a relatively small number of
notable solar events (Barnard et al. 2014). Note that, because neither Zooniverse project bears quantitative
comparison with any traditional catalogue, both are excluded from the following analysis.
5 Galaxy Zoo 1 gathered basic galactic morphologies (Lintott et al. 2011); Galaxy Zoo 2 was devoted
to detailed galactic morphologies (Willett et al. 2013); results from both projects were used to create a
catalogue of overlapping galaxies (Keel et al. 2013); the Milky Way Project found infrared bubbles in our
own galaxy (Simpson et al. 2012a); and the Andromeda Project sought stellar clusters in our neighbouring
Andromeda galaxy (Johnson et al. 2015).
6 All previous observations of overlapping galaxies are catalogued in Appendix A of (Keel et al. 2013);
traditional catalogues of infrared bubbles were compiled by Churchwell et al. (2006, 2007); the three largest
collections of basic galactic morphologies gathered by traditional means are all due to Schawinski et al.
(2007); Fukugita et al. (2007), Baillard et al. (2011), and Nair and Abraham (2010) used visual inspection to
catalogue detailed galactic morphologies of increasing size; and the three largest stellar cluster catalogues
compiled before Zooniverse were published by Bastian et al. (2012), San Roman et al. (2010), and Popescu
et al. (2012), respectively.
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Table 1 Observation totals and percent increases across five different types of astronomical catalogues
Catalogue Method Observations % Increase
Overlapping Galaxies Traditional 25
Crowdsourcing 1990 7860
Infrared Bubbles Traditional 322
Traditional 591 83.54
Crowdsourcing 5106 763.96
Basic Galactic Traditional 15,729
Morphologies Traditional 19, 649 24.92
Traditional 48,023 144.40
Crowdsourcing 738,175 1437.13
Detailed Galactic Traditional 2253
Morphologies Traditional 4458 97.87
Traditional 14,034 214.80
Crowdsourcing 304,122 2067.04
Stellar Clusters Traditional 751
Traditional 803 6.92
Traditional 920 14.57
Crowdsourcing 2753 199.24
sample size in this analysis is admittedly small, the effect size detected is very large,
Cohen’s d = 1.22, demonstrating a difference of more than a full standard deviation
between the two groups’ means. Given the strength and uniformity of these results,
we may confidently conclude that crowdsourcing is categorically superior to tradi-
tional visual inspection methods at gathering large quantities of empirical evidence
for astronomical studies. Similar results have been reported for large-scale ecology
projects (Swanson et al. 2015).
4.2 Epistemic communities and the principle of total evidence
The plot in Fig. 3 suggests that observations are a monotonically increasing function
of users in Zooniverse. Note that the deliberate redundancy mentioned in Sect. 3.1,
whereby each datum is classified numerous times by various users, has no bearing
on the regression line’s slope or residual error. The only parameter subject to change,
should all values of the dependent variable be divided by some constant (say, 38), would
be the line’s intercept, as the data points would all shift downward with no impact on
the model’s goodness of fit. This direct relationship between a project’s contributors
and its data processing power is strong evidence in favour of crowdsourcing’s scientific
utility. As we have seen, the largest astronomical catalogues ever collected were made
with the assistance of hundreds of thousands of volunteers.
The value in maximising relevant data for empirical analyses is widely recognised,
though rarely does the practice receive explicit justification. Bernoulli (1713) was
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perhaps the first to write that probability calculations require the use of all available
evidence. Keynes built upon this view, arguing that, while new observations may
raise or lower the likelihood of a given hypothesis, they invariably increase what
he called ‘the weight of evidence’, leading to ‘more substantial’ conclusions (1921,
p. 77).7 Carnap upgrades this proposal to a full blown principle, claiming that ‘In
the application of inductive logic to a given knowledge situation, the total evidence
available must be taken as basis for determining the degree of confirmation’ (1950,
p. 221). Though some have challenged Carnap on this point (Ayer 1957; McLaughlin
1970), the vast majority of philosophers, statisticians, and laypeople alike tend to view
the principle of total evidence (TE) as little more than common sense (Hempel 1960;
Efron 2010).
There are several compelling reasons to accept TE. Increased sample sizes improve
the accuracy and precision of statistical estimates and inferences, narrowing the con-
fidence intervals around predictions and parameters, thereby limiting the likelihood
of Type I and Type II errors. The epistemological merits of TE can be formalised
in a Bayesian framework using Shaked’s theorem. Let e stand for some collection
of observations, say of galactic morphologies. Let e* stand for some larger body of
similar observations, say twice as many galactic morphologies. Let h stand for some
relevant hypothesis, perhaps pertaining to the distribution of galactic morphologies.
Then while e*’s superior weight alone does not entail any conclusions regarding the
relative values of the conditional probabilities P(h|e) and P(h|e∗), we can be more
confident in the latter evaluation than in the former. It follows from Shaked’s theorem
that heavier bodies of evidence will tend to increase the veritistic value of our judgment
in h. Provided the following modified conditions are met:
(1) Relevance:
P(h) = P(h|e) and P(h) = P(h|e∗)
(2) Bounds:
0 < CA(h) < 1,
P(e|h)
P(e| ∼ h) = 1, and
P(e∗|h)
P(e∗| ∼ h) = 1
(3) Model accuracy:
CA(h) = P(h), CA(e|h)CA(e| ∼ h) =
P(e|h)
P(e| ∼ h) , and
CA(e∗|h)
CA(e∗| ∼ h) =
P(e∗|h)
P(e∗| ∼ h)
then what holds for prior and posterior probabilities in Shaked’s theorem will hold
for beliefs updated with e and e*, respectively. That is, we may derive the following
inequality:
7 The term ‘weight of evidence’ is employed in a very different sense by Good (1983), and still another
by Joyce (2005). In what follows, we adopt the Keynesian terminology. See Joyce (2005) for an insightful
breakdown of the subtle distinctions between various interpretations of evidentiary weight, balance, and
specificity in Bayesian contexts.
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E[VA(h)|e∗ − VA(h)|e] > 0.
The intuitive appeal of TE now becomes clear. An epistemic agent conditionalising
upon a relatively large collection of observations is more likely to be right about a
relevant hypothesis than she would be given a smaller body of similar evidence. This
result goes hand in hand with Good’s theorem (1967), which purports to prove that
rational agents must maximise free evidence, although his argument relies upon extra
premises that we do not consider here.
Gathering as many observations as possible for scientific investigation is not just
a matter of fine-tuning particular models. Large samples are more likely to contain
anomalous data, which numerous historians and philosophers of science point out are
crucial for theoretical progress. Such unexpected discoveries may falsify prevailing
hypotheses (Popper 1959) or perhaps even help inaugurate a new research paradigm
(Kuhn 1962). Since anomalous observations are, by definition, low probability events,
we should only expect to find them in large datasets. While one or two anomalies
could plausibly be dismissed as mere outliers, the accumulation of rare data in large
sample sizes makes their presence more salient and their need for explanation more
pressing.
Given the results of the regression in Sect. 4.1 and the preceding defence of TE,
it is tempting to conclude that veritistic value is a monotonically increasing function
of epistemic community size. Yet the generality of this claim is constrained by two
factors: the nature of a particular scientific investigation, and the technology available
to those who undertake it. The Zooniverse model is only applicable to projects with
intractable amounts of data that require little or no expertise to process. This describes
a large and diverse but by no means exhaustive set of scientific studies. Virtual citizen
science also presumes a technological context in which computational resources are
sufficiently advanced to establish a global crowdsourcing platform, but cannot (yet)
be used to reliably automate the tasks put forward to volunteers. Numerous groups,
including members of the Zooniverse team, are hard at work to create software that will
render the user classification system obsolete (Banerji et al. 2010; Simpson et al. 2012b;
Shamir et al. 2014). Zookeepers predict that, even once such programs are employed,
volunteers will remain a valuable part of e-research, helping to refine algorithms
through anomaly detection and review (Clery 2011; Fortson et al. 2012).
When it comes to participation in citizen science, the more the merrier. Only online
platforms offer the kind of scalability required to host hundreds of thousands of vol-
unteers for any given project, and only at these volumes does the data processing
power of untrained amateurs begin to compete with (or exceed) that of experts using
traditional observation methods. The combination of high quality and high quantity
data is essential for scientific confirmation and discovery.
5 Connectivity: E Pluribus Unum
The reliability and scalability of crowdsourced e-research has helped amass enormous
volumes of reliable observations across the natural sciences. But are the methodol-
ogy’s contributions limited to clever web design and evidentiary archiving, or does
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Fig. 4 Bar plots comparing mean and median citations per article for Zooniverse and other sources using
the same raw data. Since academic citations are usually power-law distributed (Barabási 2002), the median
is probably a more reliable measure of central tendency than the mean for these distributions
crowdsourcing hold promise for more substantial forms of scientific knowledge as
well?
5.1 Scientometric performance
The quality of a scientific discovery is notoriously difficult to quantify. However,
the analytic tools of scientometrics provide several methods for attempting to do so
(Price 1963; Leydesdorff 2001). Because the majority of Zooniverse projects draw
their raw data from public access archives, such as the SDSS and the Hubble Space
Telescope, other papers by scientists using the same source materials constitute the
most natural control group for scientometric analysis. Of the 68 Zooniverse articles
published before 2015, 62 were the result of projects that relied exclusively on publicly
available data. In the same timeframe, other scientists published 5522 articles using
the same sources.
Comparing the citation and journal data of these two groups provides some insight
into the relative influence of Zooniverse’s scientific output.8 A simple technique of
weighing the two samples against each other is through the common scientometric indi-
cator of citations per article. This statistic is biased towards older articles for obvious
reasons, which accounts for the steep drop off over time evident in Fig. 4. However,
both charts reveal another clear trend. Without exception, Zooniverse’s papers are
consistently more cited on average than those by scientists using traditional research
methodologies to investigate the same material. While the large discrepancy in 2008
8 Because Zooniverse has been widely studied by sociologists, only citations from natural science journals
were counted for this comparison. The true influence of Zooniverse publications in fact extends beyond this
narrowly circumscribed academic domain.
123
Synthese (2018) 195:741–764 755
Mean: 69.51 
Median: 77.66 
Mode: 44.83 
SD: 25.74 
N = 62 
Zooniverse Articles
Citation Percentile
D
en
si
ty
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
0.
02
0
0.
02
5
0.
03
0
Fig. 5 Histogram depicting the distribution of citation percentiles across all Zooniverse articles published
from 2008 to 2014. A normal curve N (50, 16.672) is overlaid for comparison, with parameters chosen so
as to centre the distribution at the middle of the citation percentile range and let all points under the curve
on [0, 100) fall within three standard deviations of the mean
is likely due to the substantial buzz around the first Galaxy Zoo article, these bar plots
demonstrate that the trend has remained remarkably persistent over time.
We might expect that the citation percentiles by year and data source for a theoretical
‘average’ lab would tend to follow an approximately normal distribution, with a small
but roughly equal number of articles performing very well and very poorly, and the
vast majority falling somewhere in between. If so, then we can confidently assert
that Zooniverse is not an average lab. Fig. 5 is a histogram of Zooniverse’s citation
percentiles, with a normal curve overlaid for comparison. We find here that nearly half
of all Zooniverse papers are in the top quintile of most cited articles for their year and
data source, with more than a quarter in the top 10 %. A K–S test found significant
deviation between these observed results and those expected of a normal distribution,
D = 0.48, p < 0.001.
The distribution of Zooniverse’s citation percentiles has a skewness of γ1 = −1.04,
reflecting a high incidence of papers in the upper ranges of most cited articles for
their year and data source. By contrast, the distribution of citation percentiles for the
5522 articles in the control group is nearly uniform. The dissimilar shapes of the
two distributions are clearly visualised in Fig. 6, where density plots for both are
overlaid for comparison. We find here that articles by researchers using traditional
methodologies are more concentrated below approximately the 50th percentile, while
Zooniverse papers are more likely to be found in the upper half of the data range. A
K–S test found significant difference between the two groups, D = 0.35, p < 0.001.
Zooniverse’s influence is rivalled only by that of the most prestigious labs in the
field. Of the 5522 articles in the control group, 136 were published by researchers affil-
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Fig. 6 Density plots representing the distribution of citation percentiles for Zooniverse articles versus those
by all others using the same raw data, and Cambridge researchers using the same raw data, respectively
iated with the University of Cambridge, home to one of the most esteemed astronomy
institutes in the world. The distribution of citation percentiles for these papers is neg-
atively skewed, γ1 = −0.43, as one might expect—but less so than that of Zooniverse
articles, indicating that the latter are more likely to have higher citation percentiles
than the former. A K–S test on the two distributions found no statistically significant
difference between them, D = 0.18, p = 0.12, suggesting that Zooniverse’s citation
percentiles could plausibly represent a random sampling of Cambridge’s.
The disparity in article influence between Zooniverse’s publications and those
from the general population cannot be accounted for by journal data alone. System-
atic comparison of the average impact factor9 and h-index10 of both groups’ top ten
most frequent publishers of articles weighted by output for each year between 2008
and 2014—journals that cumulatively account for over 90 % of all such material—
demonstrates that Zooniverse had no systematic advantage in academic visibility to
bolster its citation numbers.
While the two statistics visualised in Fig. 7 do not perfectly coincide, they both
reflect a broadly similar state of affairs. By either measure, Zooniverse’s publishers
are roughly as influential as those of other researchers using the same data sources over
time. K–S tests on the two pairs of weighted averages found insignificant differences
between the distributions, with Zooniverse’s journals tending to have marginally lower
impact factors, D = 0.57, p = 0.21, and h-indexes, D = 0.43, p = 0.54, on average.
Of course, the true value of a scientific discovery is impossible to measure. It
corresponds to an abstract and subjective concept that evolves over time and has no
clear operationalisation. However, it is hard to imagine how Zooniverse publications
9 A journal’s impact factor refers to the ratio of its total number of articles cited by other indexed publications
within the past two years, and the total number of articles published by that journal in the past two years
(Garfield 1972). Impact factor data for 2008–2014 was gathered from the ISI Journal Citation Reports.
10 A journal’s h-index is defined as its number of articles h that have each been cited in other journals at
least h times (Hirsch 2005). H-index data for 2008–2014 was compiled from Elsevier’s Scopus database.
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Fig. 7 Bar plots comparing the mean impact factor and h-index values for publishers of Zooniverse papers
with those by others using the same raw data
could so consistently outperform those by other labs in the same field using the same
data if they did not at least sometimes contain substantive contributions to scientific
discourse. This minimal claim is all that is required to answer our question at the top
of Sect. 5 in the affirmative. Crowdsourcing can and does produce high quality science
beyond mere data aggregation.
5.2 Network architecture and distributed knowledge
The quality and quantity of observations gathered by Zooniverse no doubt factors
into the strong scientometric performance of their publications over time. Novelty
and good publicity may also play a role (Cox et al. 2015). But it is the structure of
the site’s sociotechnical network that truly enables principal investigators to harness
the community’s resources for maximal discovery value. Some of Zooniverse’s most
important contributions have been the result of confused users taking to the site’s talk
forums to discuss strange objects that did not seem to fit into any of the available
categories for classification. That was the case with ‘Hanny’s voorwerp’, a large cloud
of bright green gas in the constellation Leo Minor, which researchers believe may be
the first quasar light echo ever observed (Lintott et al. 2009). User comments also
led to the discovery of so-called ‘green pea galaxies’ (Cardamone et al. 2009), triple
mergers (Darg et al. 2011), supernovas (Smith et al. 2011), and overlapping galaxies
(Keel et al. 2013) in SDSS data. Reviewing the results of their inaugural project, the
site’s founders concluded that ‘The Galaxy Zoo forum has been a scientific gold mine’
(Fortson et al. 2012, p. 226).
Zooites not only classify the objects provided by Zookeepers, but flag anomalies
for further discussion. The intermingling of diverse views and levels of expertise in
the Zooniverse talk forums naturally drives expert attention toward the most deserving
data (Page 2007). In several cases, researchers have used those findings to launch new
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Fig. 8 Diagram of sociotechnical knowledge production in Zooniverse. The first four nodes of the network
(i.e., every step prior to sending discoveries to a journal) form a recursive loop that results in increasingly
refined observational results
projects that branch off from earlier ones in pursuit of similar rare objects. This process
demonstrates the new and remarkable ways in which amateurs, experts, and digital
technologies come together to form a cohesive sociotechnical system in crowdsourced
science projects. Figure 8 depicts the knowledge production network in Zooniverse.
Note how computer-mediated human cognition at the nodes is transferred by ICTs at
the edges, creating a complex epistemic system that refines and curates observations
until ready for publication. Such recursive patterns of discovery are indicative of a
mature and fruitful scientific methodology.
The sociotechnical network depicted above is designed to unlock the distributed
knowledge of Zooites and Zookeepers. The formal definition of distributed knowledge
was originally proposed by Halpern and Moses (1990) and later refined by Fagin et al.
(1995). A complete explication of the semantics for their model of epistemic logic is
beyond the scope of this paper, but the basic idea is fairly intuitive. Their distributed
knowledge operator D is defined in such a way that, for some group of agents G, DG
represents not only the sum of all things known by G’s members, but also all valid
entailments of their pooled knowledge.11
A version of Fagin et al.’s logic is widely implemented in multiagent computing
(Wooldridge 2002), and has clear applications to any form of collaborative research.
For instance, it helps defuse the philosophical puzzles that arise when large teams of
experts produce results that no single one of them fully understands. Hardwig (1985)
calls this the problem of epistemic dependence, and proposes an elaborate theory of
justification in his effort to salvage the primacy of individual knowledge. Longino
11 Say Alice knows that either 3 or 4 is prime. Bob is unsure about 3, but he is certain that 4 is not prime.
Then even though neither Alice nor Bob alone knows that 3 is prime, together they could deduce this fact.
The knowledge that 3 is prime is distributed between Alice and Bob, whether they realise it or not.
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(1990, 2001) challenges Hardwig’s epistemic individualism, arguing that cognitive
processes are essentially social, and therefore that individual knowledge itself is either
emergent or misconstrued.
Neither alternative is particularly compelling. Longino’s account has counterin-
tuitive consequences for philosophy of mind, while Hardwig’s appears to be based
on a metaphysical misunderstanding. His reticence to grant epistemic agency to an
entire research group is probably rooted in the metatheoretical desire for ontological
parsimony. If we have already acknowledged the existence of agents A and B, then
we would rather avoid countenancing the existence of some third agent C such that
C = A ∪ B. It is not entirely clear, however, what metaphysical commitments accom-
pany propositions like ‘The jury finds the defendant guilty’, ‘The army won the battle’,
‘The class is on a field trip’, etc. Multiagent systems are regularly treated as perfectly
ordinary epistemic (Goldman 2003) and indeed moral subjects (Floridi 2013).
Mereological subtleties and confusions abound in the natural sciences, not least
because it is often difficult or impossible to establish the ideal unit of analysis (Winther
2011). The question of when to assign collective agency to a group of individuals
raises particularly vexing issues in biology (Jones 2017), not to mention moral phi-
losophy (Searle 1990). Some notable philosophers argue that all talk of aggregation is
essentially pragmatic, with little or no ontological implications. For example, Hume
(1748/2008) writes that ‘the uniting of…parts into a whole, like the uniting of sev-
eral distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body,
is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the
nature of things’ (9.11/65). Wittgenstein echoes this sentiment, rejecting the notion
that there are any objective distinctions to be drawn between parts and wholes. ‘To
the philosophical question: “Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are
its component parts?” the correct answer is: “That depends on what you understand
by ‘composite’.” (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question)’
(1953, § 47).
The sociotechnical network may not be a metaphysical entity per se, but its epis-
temic agency is explanatorily essential to the knowledge it generates at the system
level of abstraction (Floridi 2011; Winther 2011). The mere aggregation of Zooni-
verse’s units—some users here, a mainframe there—does not begin to account for
the site’s consistent output of high impact scientific publications. It is the complete
sociotechnical process, not a summation of localised knowers, that leads to new and
influential discoveries in crowdsourced e-research. Proper coordination is essential
(Floridi 2004). Cautious philosophers who accept the notion of distributed cognition
but balk at the idea of extended or collective agency (e.g., Giere 2007) are insisting on
a distinction without a difference. Drawing circles around every individual involved
in these projects and declaring that agency can only exist within those borders is as
arbitrary as it is unnecessary (Longino 2013). Epistemic agency supervenes upon the
people and technology of which the sociotechnical system is comprised, leveraging
both human intelligence and computational resources. Crowdsourcing is hardly the
only activity in which this kind of heterogeneous connectivity is evident (Hutchins
1995; Cetina 1999; Latour 2005), but it does pose a vivid example of how large groups
come together to forge scientific knowledge.
123
760 Synthese (2018) 195:741–764
Crowdsourced science may constitute a radical departure from traditional research
methodologies, but its most interesting features lie not in what it adds to scientific
inquiry so much as what it reveals about it. Note how technology permeates every
step in the knowledge production chain diagrammed in Fig. 8. Not only do the arrows
depict the flow of information through ICT networks, but at every node people use com-
puters to generate, analyse, simulate, and/or disseminate information to other nodes.
While epistemologists over the last few decades have begun to focus on the social
aspects of science, comparatively little attention has been paid to its technological
underpinnings.
The very act of measurement itself, perhaps the most fundamental of all scientific
activities, requires at least some minimal tools. Especially in the natural sciences,
where sophisticated instruments are increasingly operated by computers, simulation
has become an essential research methodology, and large groups of collaborators
frequently share data via online networks, there can be no denying that technology
functions as a mediating, even constitutive component of epistemic systems.
6 Conclusion
Statistical analysis of Zooniverse’s publications and user activity indicates that crowd-
sourcing is a uniquely reliable, scalable, and connective method of generating scientific
knowledge. This empirical evidence is supported by Bayesian reasoning within an
epistemological framework that seeks to maximise the expected veritistic value of
scientific hypotheses. Our work clarifies the philosophical foundations of virtual cit-
izen science and highlights the irreducibly sociotechnical component of scientific
research.
Collaboration and computation are ubiquitous across the natural sciences, and
have been for decades. The recent popularity of websites like Zooniverse is a salient
reminder of how potent the combination of large epistemic communities and well-
designed technologies can be. The philosophical implications of this union have not
gone completely unremarked (see Cetina 1999; Clark 2008; Floridi 2011), and some
recent unpublished doctoral dissertations (e.g., Zollman 2007; Simon 2010) suggest
that it may be a growing area of research. Further investigation of science’s sociotech-
nical nature will prove fruitful for theorists and practitioners alike.
We cannot be certain just what scientific developments the future holds in store,
but we can be confident that many of our next great discoveries will be made thanks
to some complex partnership of minds and machines. Whether or not such results are
the product of crowdsourcing, thorough investigation of this strange and remarkable
methodology sheds new light on the varied modes of human knowledge. Clearly the
time has come to endorse a sociotechnical turn in the philosophy of science that com-
bines insights from statistics and logic to analyse the latest developments in scientific
research.
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